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I.

INTRODUCTION

The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is,
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, this
Court would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Such a
rule would, indeed, obviate the fear that the prospect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dissuade a timorous press from the effective exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. Yet absolute protection for the communications
media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value
served by the law of defamation.1
The above quote from Justice Powell’s opinion in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. articulates what may be an obvious and tautological proposition: if defamers are immune, the defamed are without a remedy. However,
1.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (citations omitted).
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the current state of internet defamation law often does result in a “sacrifice
of the competing value served by the law of defamation,” and subsequently
does leave the defamed without a remedy.2
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) has created an environment where defamed individuals are left with a limited or non-existent
opportunity to litigate their claims due to the immunity and/or the anonymity of their defamer.3 The relatively free and unregulated internet, due in part
to legislation like the CDA, has given users vast new opportunities to express ideas, however, this freedom has come with costs.4
Consider the following example: Oliver, an owner of a small donut
shop, has been defamed on a Yahoogle Internet message board. Who is
Oliver’s defamer? An anonymous person who posted under the pseudonym
or screen-name “The Count of Cristo.” Oliver seeks judicial redress for the
harm caused by The Count’s false statement; however, he encounters a barrier: the anonymity of his masked defamer. Oliver can (1) file a John Doe
defamation action and hope that upon discovery he can satisfy the uncertain
and ambiguous elements necessary to compel Yahoogle’s disclosure of The
Count’s identifying information;5 (2) attempt to compel disclosure under
state procedural rules, for example, under a rule like Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 224;6 (3) embark on a likely futile search, expending his own resources, to track down the identity of his anonymous assailant outside the
court system; or (4) join the ranks of those small business owners and private persons defamed and injured by unknown attackers who are left without an opportunity to adjudicate their claim.7
This Comment considers the goals of defamation law, the necessity of
preserving free speech on the internet, and the legal remedies available for
individuals like Oliver. Additionally, it will make some suggestions as to
what forms of regulation (or lack of regulation) might strike the most reasonable balance between the current law under the CDA and the traditional

2. See id. at 341; see also Roger M. Rosen & Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Internet Defamation, L.A. LAWYER, Oct. 2001, at 19, 19 (offering an
account of the difficulties a prospective plaintiff and her lawyer will face in pursuing an
internet defamation claim).
3. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (creating a
situation where an individual with an otherwise legitimate claim was left without compensation because the only available defendant was granted immunity through section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act).
4. See 41 U.S.C. § 230 (2011) (praising the freedom of expression that unregulated
internet has provided).
5. E.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001).
6. E.g., Maxon v. Ottawa Publ’g Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
7. E.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. Arguably, Oliver’s situation is similar to Zeran’s
predicament; the plaintiff has a legitimate claim, but no defendant. See id.
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right of the defamed to seek compensation for the injury to their reputation.8
This Comment seeks to show that section 230 of the CDA (Section
230) is both overly broad and unnecessary as a means to achieve many of
its proposed goals.9 It strips plaintiffs of a meaningful opportunity to litigate
legitimate claims while creating an unsupported distinction between internet defamation and all other kinds of defamation.10 Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act was an ill-advised alteration of defamation
law that should be repealed. More important, it can be repealed without
chilling the most desirable kind of speech: “political speech.”11
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

COMMON LAW AND DEFAMATION

An analysis of the current shortcomings of internet defamation law requires an understanding of the historical goals and structure of the law of
defamation.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the following concise definition of defamation: “A communication is defamatory if it tends so to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him.”12 The Restatement also sets out the traditional elements of an action
in defamation: “(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least
to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication.”13

8. As with any common law tort, defamation laws do and will vary across jurisdictions; however, some generalizations can be made and the Restatement (Second) of Torts
helps in summarizing those generalizations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559
(1977).
9. 41 U.S.C. § 230 (2011) (indicating that although the Communications Decency
Act is a huge piece of legislation targeted at “cleaning up” the internet, Section 230 is one
small part of that legislation).
10. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d 327. Zeran is illuminating because had AOL been a
print magazine or newspaper, Zeran would have succeeded in a claim against AOL; Zeran
had no case because the statement was made online, not because the claim was frivolous. Id.
11. Essentially, political speech (the kind of speech that is celebrated in the anonymous Federalist Papers) is already receiving significant protections through state statutes
and constitutional interpretation. See infra Part V.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
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The law of defamation, like many laws, can be seen as a balancing
act.14 Effective defamation laws are implemented to strike a balance between the First Amendment speech rights of the speaker and the rights of
the defamed to protect their reputation and to be compensated for injuries to
it.15 Section 230 of the CDA eliminates this balance and has resulted in a
legal paradigm where First Amendment speech rights are almost absolutely
protected, regardless of the type of speech, at a significant cost to the defamed.16
These black letter rules become much more transparent when described within an example; the Restatement (Second) of Torts uses the following illustration: “A advertises in a newspaper that B, a nurse, uses and
recommends to her patients the use of a certain brand of whiskey for medicinal purposes. If a substantial number of respectable persons in the community regard this use of whiskey as discreditable, A has defamed B.”17 This
hypothetical, of course, is operating on the presumption that B does not use
whiskey for medicinal purposes.18 If B did use this particular brand of
whiskey for medicinal purposes, A could raise a defense of truth to B’s
action in defamation.19
Once it has been established that an individual may have a cause of action in defamation, the prospective plaintiff must determine whom to sue. It
should be noted, in the words of Professor Rodney Smolla: “The term ‘publication’ is technical, and does not in any sense refer to printing or mass
dissemination; rather, it applies to both slander and libel cases, and refers to
any form of defamatory communication to a third party, whether written or
oral or through gestures, symbols, or another means.”20 A publisher, therefore, is the speaker or author of the defamatory conduct.21 Another relevant
group of persons potentially liable are republishers: entities that publish the
14. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (using the language
of “balance” between the “press and the individuals”).
15. See RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:1 (2d ed. 2011) (beginning the
introductory paragraphs of perhaps the most influential treatise on defamation with a focus
on this important distinction).
16. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). The authors of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts indicate that this example was taken from Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S.
185 (1909). In Peck, the plaintiff was a woman whose portrait was published in a newspaper
alongside a statement that as a nurse she recommended a particular brand of whiskey to her
patients. Id. at 188. The plaintiff contended she was not a nurse and that she abstained from
the use of alcohol. Id. Justice Holmes wrote the opinion that held that the newspaper was
liable to the plaintiff for the publication of her portrait alongside a false statement. Id. at 190.
18. Id.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
20. SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:78.
21. Id.
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defamatory content again.22 At common law, a republisher is liable for the
defamatory statements they publish as if they themselves were the original
publisher.23 This is of particular importance in the case of internet defamation where the only known or accessible party may be the website on which
the defamatory statements were posted.24 Distributors are a third group of
persons potentially liable in defamation.25 Distributors are persons who
disseminate the defamatory material through something like a bookstore,
“the post office,” or “by a phone.”26 A distributor, unlike a publisher or
republisher, is typically liable for his distribution of defamatory content
only if “he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.”27 The
distributors and publishers of defamatory statements deserve particular notice because it is often only because of their ability to publish and distribute
that a defamatory statement ever becomes damaging at all.28 An individual
making false statements about another causes no harm if the statements
never reach another’s ears. For example, if A stands alone in the desert and
screams false things about B, and no person ever hears them, no damage is
done to B’s reputation. It is based upon this simple truism that publishers,
traditionally, face liability for publication of defamatory statements.29
How does the common law parlance of defamation apply to the example of Oliver and The Count? The Count is the original publisher or author
of the defamatory speech, and Yahoogle is the republisher, and possibly the
22. Id. The several categories of publishers seem straightforward on their face, but it
is their applicability to internet speech that is unique and critical to this debate.
23. See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] person who
repeats a defamatory statement is generally liable as the one who first utters it . . . .”); Condit
v. Dunne, 317 F. Supp. 2d 344, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:87 (“Each
republication is a new tort subjecting the repeater to liability independent of the original
publisher . . . .”).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. Whether or not an internet site can be liable as a distributor has become a significant source of debate surrounding the CDA, with the answer, so far, being in the negative.
See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 519 (Cal. 2006).
26. SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:92. See Osmond v. EWAP, Inc., 153 Cal. App. 3d
842, 852 (1984) (applying the distributor/publisher distinction as set out in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts); Barrett, 146 P.3d at 519 (interpreting the applicability of CDA immunity
to the distributor/publisher distinction).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977). The court in Barrett provided
an articulation of the policy rationale for the publisher/republisher distinction. See Barrett,
146 P.3d at 517. “The distinction is a practical one. Publishers are ordinarily aware of the
content of their copy. It is not reasonable, however, to expect distributors to be familiar with
the particulars of every publication they offer for sale. Therefore, only a distributor who is
aware of defamatory content shares liability with the publisher.” Id. at 517 n.8.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977) (suggesting the fact that they
are a proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff is the reason for their liability in the first
place).
29. See Barrett, 146 P.3d at 517 (providing the rationale for publisher liability).
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distributor, of the defamatory statement.30 Thus, under the common law,
Oliver has a cause of action against both the original publisher (The Count)
and Yahoogle (the republisher).31
B.

INTERNET DEFAMATION BEFORE THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT

There were instances of internet defamation that arose before the enactment of the CDA. The most often cited example of this is a case that, in
large part, motivated the creation of Section 230.32 In Stratton v. Prodigy,
Stratton sued a computer network (Prodigy) for its publication of libelous
statements.33 The New York state court, applying the distributor/publisher
analysis to the issue, determined that Prodigy was a publisher and therefore
was liable to Stratton for its publication of the defamatory content.34 Prodigy had edited the defamatory content that was posted to its message
board.35 It was because of this editorial alteration that the court held Prodigy to be a publisher.36 Stratton is significant in understanding the CDA because it represents a state of internet law where the defamed was afforded a
meaningful opportunity to obtain a remedy for the injury to his reputation.37
Thus, prior to passage of the Communications Decency Act, at least
the Stratton court saw it fit to analyze internet defamation under the same
rubric that governs all other forms of defamation.38 However, the CDA
brought a swift end to internet defamation as it was treated in Stratton.39

30. See, e.g., id. (discussing the importance of the distributor/publisher distinction
in an internet defamation suit).
31. See id.
32. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 229, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1995); David Lukmire, Note, Can the
Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America
Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 376 (2010).
33. Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *3.
34. Id. at *3.
35. Id. at *2. The “editorial” input of the publisher remains significant even after the
enactment of the CDA because an interactive computer service (ICS) can be liable if it is
also an information content provider (ICP). See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011). However, where the
line between ICS and ICP lies is an altogether separate and complex question that the CDA
sheds little light on. See 47 USC § 230 (2011). Put differently, if substantial alteration of
content occurs, an otherwise immune party can be liable as the original speaker or author of
a defamatory statement. Id.
36. Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *11.
37. Id.
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (explaining common law
defamation in summary form).
39. See S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 435 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (indicating the express
intent of Congress to overrule Stratton).
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THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT

In 1997, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA).40
While the CDA does many things, for the purposes of this Comment, the
focus will remain on the structure and import of Section 230.41 The CDA
does not use the common law terminology described above but, instead,
defines the relevant terms within the statute itself. 42
For the purposes of this Comment, there are two terms within the CDA
itself that are particularly relevant: interactive computer service and information content provider.43 The CDA defines an interactive computer service as “any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”44 It should be noted that this term is not universally used,
and there are several terms, often ambiguous, that are used to describe the
internet site that “publishes” or “hosts” the defamatory content. The most
common misnomer is Internet Service Provider (ISP).45 Despite the various
other meanings of the word, courts regularly refer to interactive computer
services as “the ISP.”46 The CDA also defines an information content provider as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
any other interactive computer service.”47
The salient aspect of Section 230 of the CDA is its treatment of interactive computer services.48 The CDA provides that “[n]o provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider.”49 In

40. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011). See also The Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ104.104.pdf (the public law
version demonstrates the breadth of the entire act).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011).
42. Id. § 230(f).
43. See id. § 230.
44. Id. § 230(f)(2).
45. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (misusing the term ISP to refer to Yahoo, the third party website that provided the
message board where the defamatory content was posted).
46. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (speaking about
the CDA as it applies to ISPs).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (indicating that should liability be imposed on an ICS for
its ‘editorial work’ (as in Stratton), it would occur under this section).
48. Id. § 230(f).
49. Id. § 230(c)(1).
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light of the discussion above, it becomes immediately clear that this legislation marks a stark contrast from traditional defamation law.50
D.

INTERPRETING THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT

1.

Zeran v. America Online, Inc.

Just what the strength of Section 230 would be was not immediately
known.51 Yet, some opinions, particularly the Fourth Circuit’s in Zeran v.
America Online, Inc., made clear that Section 230 immunity would be
broad and essentially absolute.52
In Zeran, an anonymous person posted on an AOL message board a
false advertisement for t-shirts that featured “offensive and tasteless slogans
related to the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City.”53 The anonymous post further indicated that
those interested should contact “Ken” at Zeran’s phone number.54 After
receiving countless hate calls and threats, Zeran sued AOL.55
The district court accepted AOL’s contention that Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act provided a defense and granted judgment on
the pleadings in favor of AOL.56 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court
held that Section 230 grants “broad immunity” to publishers and that AOL
could not be held liable as a publisher.57 In response to Zeran’s argument
that AOL could still be held liable under a Stratton analysis as a distributor,58 the Fourth Circuit held that Section 230 grants to AOL, and other interactive computer services, distributor immunity as well as publisher immunity.59 The court noted that imposing distributor liability would result in
an atmosphere where interactive computer services would be reluctant to
screen offensive or defamatory material for fear it would subject them to
liability, which would be contrary to the legislature’s goals in passing the
50. David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147,
173 (1997) (discussing the various ways a person can and often does seek recourse in a
defamation action and how the CDA has changed that).
51. See S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 435 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (providing some indication
of the intended effect of the Communications Decency Act). See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)
(2011) (the act itself also gives some idea of what its effect would be).
52. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
53. Id. at 329.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 330.
57. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
58. Id. at 332.
59. Id. at 333.
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CDA.60 Essentially, Zeran set forth a precedent of CDA interpretation that
resulted in total immunity for interactive computer services. Put differently,
after Zeran, it became clear that those who are defamed online could no
longer pursue publishers and distributors as defendants, not because they
are publishers and distributors, but merely because they publish or distribute on the internet.61
The court in Zeran, likely realizing the dramatic implications of the
CDA and its holding, made the following statement: “None of this means,
of course, that the original culpable party who posts defamatory messages
would escape accountability.”62 Apparently, the court had forgotten that in
a footnote, just a page prior, they had indicated, “Zeran maintains that AOL
made it impossible to identify the original party by failing to maintain adequate records of its users.”63 Thus, Zeran was left without remedy.64 His
allegations, taken as true, constituted a cause of action in defamation.65
However, without a defendant, due to immunity and anonymity, Zeran was
left out in the cold.66
III.

OPTIONS FOR THE DEFAMED

What recourse can a defamed person like Oliver or Zeran seek when
Yahoogle or AOL is immune from liability? As the court in Zeran noted,
the original poster of the defamatory content remains liable. The conclusion
seems simple: the plaintiff will just file suit against that person. However,
as was the case in Zeran, sometimes that person’s identity is not or cannot
be known.67
60. Id. (discussing how chilled “cleaning up” action stems from a fear of becoming
liable as an information content provider).
61. The action of Congress in passing the CDA, together with the Zeran court’s
interpretation, constituted a total reversal of the Stratton treatment of internet defamation.
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94,
1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1995).
62. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
63. Id. at 329 n.1.
64. Id. at 335 (affirming the trial court’s judgment and eliminating liability for the
only accessible defendant, thus, stripping Zeran of his only opportunity to recover).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (indicating that the statements made in a case like Zeran’s are almost textbook defamation).
66. A similar issue was addressed in Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C. 1998), where a defamatory statement, the “Drudge Report,” prompted Sidney Blumenthal to file suit against AOL and the report’s author, Matt Drudge. Blumenthal argued
that both Drudge and AOL were liable because they were both publishers of the defamatory
statements. Id. at 49. Acknowledging that under a traditional analysis Blumenthal may be
correct, the court noted that because of the passage of section 230 of the CDA, his argument
had “been rendered irrelevant by Congress.” Id.
67. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
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JOHN DOE DEFAMATION ACTION

One option available to persons defamed online by an anonymous
poster/speaker is a John Doe lawsuit.68 This is a less than simple mechanism by which to determine the identity of one’s defamer. Additionally, this
complex tool does not always prove fruitful.69 Upon initiating a lawsuit
against a John Doe defendant, the plaintiff must seek authorization from the
court to serve a third party subpoena on the immune internet site (interactive computer service) where the content was posted.70 Simple though the
procedure sounds, in practice, the plaintiff faces enormous hurdles.71 Several barriers to the plaintiff’s success in disclosing John Doe’s identity may
arise: (1) the court may find that the plaintiff does not satisfy the procedural
requirements necessary to compel discovery, (2) the internet publisher may
file a motion to quash the subpoena, or (3) the identifying information may
no longer exist.72
Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, which has received considerable
scholarly commentary, sets forth a standard by which a John Doe defendant’s identity can be disclosed.73 In Dendrite, a plaintiff filed a John Doe
defamation suit with the hopes of compelling disclosure of John Doe’s
identity.74 Dendrite attempted to compel Yahoo to honor a subpoena in order to determine the identity of his defamer. Both the trial court and the
New Jersey Superior Court denied Dendrite’s request.75
The Dendrite court set forth a five-part test by which courts should
consider the merit of a plaintiff’s request to compel disclosure of an unknown defendant.76 The court held that when a plaintiff makes a request of
this kind, (1) the plaintiff must provide notice to the anonymous posters and
provide them an opportunity to oppose the disclosure request; (2) the plaintiff must set out the statements that allegedly constitute defamatory speech;
(3) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case against the anonymous
68. See Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 19 (describing the process of pursuing
such a John Doe lawsuit).
69. See id. (discussing the harsh reality that a John Doe lawsuit is no easy venture).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 19-20; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329 (suggesting there was no identifying
information because AOL had not retained any information which might have led to identification of Zeran’s defamer).
73. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). See,
e.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John
Doe? 50 B.C. L. REV 1373 (2009); Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe:
Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405 (2003).
74. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 759.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 760.
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person(s); (4) the plaintiff must set forth evidence to support each element
of the cause of action; and (5) the court must balance the anonymous defendant’s free speech rights against the strength of the plaintiff’s claim.77
In applying its test and evaluating the merit of a similar test applied by
the trial court, the New Jersey Superior Court held that Dendrite failed to
meet the requirements necessary to compel disclosure of the defendant’s
identity.78 The net result under the New Jersey state court’s analysis is that
a plaintiff is left without a meaningful opportunity to litigate his claim
merely because the defamatory statements were posted online. Had the
statements been printed in a newspaper, Dendrite would have been able to
file suit against the paper as well as the anonymous speaker and would have
been able to compel disclosure without the myriad of hoops the Dendrite
court imposed.79
Doe v. Cahill, a Delaware Supreme Court case, exemplifies the confusion that surrounds unmasking standards.80 In Cahill, the plaintiff sought to
serve process on his unknown John Doe defamer and so “sought to compel
the disclosure of his identity from a third party that had the information.”81
The trial court applied a good faith standard to Cahill’s discovery request.
The good faith standard required: “(1) that they had a legitimate, good faith
basis upon which to bring the underlying claim; (2) that the identifying information sought was directly and materially related to their claim; and (3)
that the information could not be obtained from any other source.”82 Applying this standard, the trial court ordered Comcast, the third party, to disclose
John Doe’s identity.83 On appeal, John Doe contested the order to compel
disclosure of his identity, which resulted in the Delaware Supreme Court
formulating its own standard for disclosure of John Doe defendants’ identities.84 The Supreme Court of Delaware essentially adopted the Dendrite
test, recognizing it as a summary judgment standard, where a plaintiff must
plead facts and present sufficient evidence to survive a summary judgment
analysis.85 The court developed this heightened standard out of a fear that a

77. Id. (providing a more detailed account of these steps).
78. See id. at 772.
79. Salzano v. North Jersey Media Grp., Inc., 993 A.2d 778 (N.J. 2008).
80. Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 864 (2010).
81. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005).
82. Id. at 455.
83. Id. (ordering disclosure after denying John Doe’s motion for a protective order).
84. Id. at 460 (modeling its standard on the Dendrite standard).
85. See id. at 465 (citing Dendrite and announcing that it will use it in creating a
standard).
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suit without merit might strip an anonymous defendant of the constitutional
protections he is due: the supposed right to remain anonymous.86
The Dendrite/Cahill test, or summary judgment standard, is a very
high burden for plaintiffs to meet. The plaintiff must plead and prove their
case before they even know the identity of their defamer.87 The plaintiff in
Cahill, like the plaintiffs in Dendrite and Zeran, was ultimately left without
a defendant and with no meaningful opportunity to cure the injury to his
reputation.
B.

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULE 224

Another option potentially available to those defamed by anonymous
persons is through a mechanism like Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 (Rule
224). Rule 224 sets forth that “[a] person or entity who wishes to engage in
discovery for the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may
be responsible in damages may file an independent action for such discovery.”88 Additionally, the rule states:
The petition shall be brought in the name of the petitioner
and shall name as respondents the persons or entities from
whom discovery is sought and shall set forth: (A) the reason the proposed discovery is necessary and (B) the nature
of the discovery sought and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to obtain such discovery.89
The words of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224 alone are not very helpful in determining the standard by which disclosure of identity will be compelled. In Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co., the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Third District interpreted Rule 224.90 In Maxon, several anonymous
users of MyWebTimes.com posted statements allegedly defaming the
Maxons for their involvement in Ottawa’s Planning Commission.91 The
trial court adopted the Dendrite/Cahill test to “balance the rights of a person
not to be defamed with the first-amendment free-speech rights of anony-

86. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458. Whether, and to what extent, such a right actually
exists is an unsettled matter. See infra Part IV.
87. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458.
88. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 224 § (A)(1)(i) (2011).
89. Id. § (A)(1)(ii).
90. Maxon v. Ottawa Publ’g. Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2010)
(quoting the trial court: “[i]n so doing, the court noted that no Illinois case law addressed the
question of what degree of analysis was required to grant a Rule 224 petition seeking the
identity of anonymous Internet posters alleged to have committed the tort of defamation”).
91. Id. at 670.
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mous posters.”92 Applying that test, the court held that the Maxons could
not satisfy a summary judgment standard.93 On appeal, Rule 224 received a
vastly different interpretation. The Third District Appellate Court set forth a
four-part analysis of Rule 224, which significantly relaxes the Dendrite/Cahill standard.94 The court held:
Thus, where a trial court must rule upon a petition to disclose the identity of any anonymous potential defamation
defendant pursuant to Rule 224, the court must insure that
the petition: (1) is verified; (2) states with particularity
facts that would establish a cause of action for defamation;
(3) seeks only the identity of the potential defendant and no
other information necessary to establish the cause of action
of defamation; and (4) is subjected to a hearing at which
the court determines that the petition sufficiently states a
cause of action for defamation against the unnamed potential defendant, i.e., the unidentified person is one who is responsible in damages to the petitioner.95
The court added (in words that seem to address the Dendrite court) that
those who hold concerns for protection against frivolous disclosure requests, or “fishing,” forget that “trial courts have a readily available mechanism to determine whether the petition sufficiently states a cause of action
against the potential defendant in section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”96 Section 2-615 is referred to as Illinois’s motion to dismiss
for deficiencies in the pleadings.97
The Maxon court bolsterd its opinion by establishing its view that “it is
overly broad to assert that anonymous speech, in and of itself, warrants
constitutional protection.”98 The Third District reversed the trial court and
remanded the case, finding that Dendrite/Cahill added unnecessary additional requirements to the standard it developed stating multiple times “that

92. Id. at 672.
93. Id. (reasoning that the context of the postings rendered them “nonactionable
opinions as a matter of law”).
94. Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 673.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 673-74.
97. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-615 (2011).
98. See Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 674-75. The court stated, after considering each of
the Supreme Court’s anonymous speech cases, “[w]e find nothing in these cases to support
the proposition that anonymous Internet speakers enjoy a higher degree of protection from
claims of defamation than the private individual who has a cause of action against him for
defamation.” Id.
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there is no constitutional right to defame.”99 The court additionally noted,
contrary to the trial court’s holding, that the Maxons had stated a cause of
action for defamation.100
The standard set forth in Maxon is a dramatic shift from the one stated
in Dendrite and Cahill.101 The Third District Appellate Court in Illinois
established a position that courts can develop a viable system for compelled
disclosure that is less damaging to plaintiffs.
IV.

ANONYMITY

Much of the discussion among courts regarding the protection of the
anonymous posters involves the blanket assertion that there is a constitutionally granted right to anonymous speech buried within the First Amendment.102 It is not debated that the Supreme Court has discussed a right to
anonymous speech.103 However, there is a question as to how broad or narrow that right is or, perhaps better stated, whether there exists an actual
right to anonymity at all. The Supreme Court had occasion to evaluate a
“right to anonymity” in the following cases.104
In Talley v. California, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Los
Angeles ordinance requiring that no handbill could be distributed without
the name of “[t]he person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured
the same.”105 The handbills, it should be noted, were of a political nature, as
they sought to promote a boycott of employers that did not provide equal
employment opportunities for minorities.106 The Court held the ordinance
99. Id. at 675. The crux of this point is that even if we are to assume there exists a
constitutional right to remain anonymous, the anonymity right must be balanced alongside
the truth that there is no right to defame. See id.
100. See id. (disagreeing with the trial court, and holding that the statements were
actionable because they could be construed as statements of fact).
101. See Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 672 (noting that its holding represented a diversion
from the Dendrite/Cahill standards).
102. Id.
103. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc. v. Village of Straton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
104. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Doe v.
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc., 536 U.S. 150; Buckley
v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
105. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 61 (1960).
106. The Court gave the following description of the handbills in question:
The handbills urged readers to help the organization carry on a boycott
against certain merchants and businessmen, whose names were given, on
the ground that, as one set of handbills said, they carried products of
“manufacturers who will not offer equal employment opportunities to
Negroes, Mexicans, and Orientals.” There also appeared a blank, which,
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unconstitutional because a “fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful
discussions of public matters of importance.”107
Though the majority opinion seems, at least on some level, to have established a right to anonymity, Justice Clark, in dissent, wrote to remind us
that there is no such constitutional right.108 Justice Clark wrote, “[t]he Constitution says nothing about freedom of anonymous speech.”109 Justice
Clark’s dissenting opinion then went on to cite two Supreme Court cases
and thirty state laws that required identification of speakers.110 Plainly stated, in the eyes of Justice Clark, the rationale for the invalidation of the Los
Angeles ordinance could not rest upon a right to anonymous speech because there is no such right.111
In a later anonymous speech case, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme Court invalidated an Ohio law that prohibited anonymous campaign literature.112 It articulated its decision as one that addressed the question of “whether and to what extent the First Amendment’s
protection of anonymity encompasses documents intended to influence the
electoral process.”113 In light of the nature of that question and the fact that
core political speech was at issue, the Court applied “exacting scrutiny” to
the Ohio law.114 It was through this narrow lens that the Supreme Court
furthered the right to anonymity. The Court implied in its conclusion that
the supposed right does not encompass fraudulent or defamatory speech.115
The Court suggested this when it said: “Ohio has not shown that its interest
in preventing the misuse of anonymous election-related speech justifies a
prohibition of all uses of that speech.”116 McIntyre, like Talley, made some

Id.

if signed, would request enrollment of the signer as a “member of National Consumers Mobilization,” and which was preceded by a statement
that “I believe that every man should have an equal opportunity for employment no matter what his race [sic] religion, or place of birth.”

107. Id. at 65.
108. Id. at 70 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“I stand second to none in supporting Talley’s
right of free speech—but not his freedom of anonymity.”).
109. Id.
110. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 61 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Lewis Publ’g Co. v.
Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)). Justice
Clark noted that “[t]hirty-six States have statutes prohibiting the anonymous distribution of
materials relating to elections. E.g.: Kan.G.S.1949, s 25-1714; M.S.A. s 211.08; Page’s Ohio
R.C. s 3599.09; Purdon’s Pa.Stat.Ann., Title 25, s 3546.” Talley, 362 U.S. at 70 n.2 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
111. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 71.
112. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336 (1995).
113. Id. at 344.
114. Id. at 347.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 357. The Court made this same point earlier in the opinion, stating:
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suggestion that there is a right to anonymous speech; however, insofar as
the Court in these cases explicated an anonymity right, it did so narrowly.
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, the Supreme
Court evaluated the extent of a right to anonymity for a third time. 117 In
Buckley, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in invalidating a Colorado law, which required persons circulating
initiative-petitions to wear name badges.118 The Supreme Court in Buckley,
like it had done in McIntyre, articulated its holdings in terms of the negative
effect on political speech: “[i]n sum, we conclude . . . that Colorado’s current badge requirement discourages participation in the petition circulation
process by forcing name identification without sufficient cause.”119 The
majority, dissent, and concurrence were all in agreement that the name
badge requirement of the Colorado law was unconstitutional. It should be
noted that each opinion supporting this position placed great emphasis on
the fact that “core political speech” was the type of speech at issue.120 The
Buckley court did recognize a right to anonymity; however, that right was
narrowly articulated as one that relates to “core political speech.”121
One of the Court’s more recent forays into the realm of anonymous
speech was Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, Inc.122 In Watchtower, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Ohio village ordinance that prohib-

The Ohio statute likewise contains no language limiting its application to
fraudulent, false, or libelous statements; to the extent, therefore, that
Ohio seeks to justify § 3599.09(A) as a means to prevent the dissemination of untruths, its defense must fail for the same reason given in Talley.
As the facts of this case demonstrate, the ordinance plainly applies even
when there is no hint of falsity or libel.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344. The Court seems to imply that had the Ohio statute been narrowly tailored to publications of a defamatory nature, the right of anonymity would not be applicable. Id. at 344.
117. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
118. Id. at 190.
119. Id. at 200. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344.
120. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion noted that the law in question was declared
invalid because it was “restrictive of political speech.” Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186. Justice
Thomas wrote, in concurrence, that the badge law was unconstitutional because it restricted
“core political speech.” Id. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, noted, “[r]equiring petition circulators to reveal their names while
circulating a petition directly regulates the core political speech of petition circulation.” Id.
at 217 (O’Connor, J., concurring). For that reason, the name badge requirement “should be
subject to, and fails, strict scrutiny.” Id.
121. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186.
122. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150
(2002).
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ited anonymous door-to-door advocacy.123 The Court’s analysis of anonymous speech was short and conclusory.124 However, the Court did give
some consideration to the fact that some door-to-door advocates would not
be able to advocate anonymously when it struck down the ordinance.125
In Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, the Supreme
Court disclaimed a broad “right to anonymity.”126 Citizens United addressed the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA).127 The BCRA, in Section 441(b), prohibited “corporations
and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent
expenditures for speech defined as an ‘electioneering communication’ or
for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
date.”128 The Court held that the BCRA constituted an “outright ban,
backed by criminal sanctions.”129 Additionally, the Court held, “We find no
basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to this conclusion.”130 The Court places heavy emphasis
on the political nature of the speech, calling it “indispensable.”131 It is in
this context that the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the disclosure
requirement set forth by the BCRA.132
“Under BCRA § 311, televised electioneering communications funded
by anyone other than a candidate must include a disclaimer that ‘____ is
responsible for the content of this advertising.’”133 The Citizens United
123. Id. at 155 (summarizing the ordinance, “[s]ection 116.01 prohibits ‘canvassers’
and others from ‘going in and upon’ private residential property for the purpose of promoting any ‘cause’ without first having obtained a permit pursuant to § 116.03”).
124. See id. at 166-67. The Court’s limited analysis of anonymous speech is due in
part to the fact that the court focused more on the reprehensibility of the all-out restriction of
unregistered door-to-door canvassers, as opposed to the narrow issue of disclosure of their
identity. Id.
125. See id. at 166.
126. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
127. See id. at 880.
128. Id. at 879.
129. Id. at 897.
130. Id. at 899.
131. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 913-14. There are additional elements to the disclosure:
The required statement must be made in a “clearly spoken manner,” and
displayed on the screen in a “clearly readable manner” for at least four
seconds. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2). It must state that the communication “is
not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee”; it must also
display the name and address (or web site address) of the person or
group that funded the advertisement.
Id. at 914.
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Court considered the constitutionality of that section.134 The Court considered the disclosure requirements in a manner that seemed to refute the notion of a right to anonymity, stating, “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they . . . do not prevent anyone
from speaking.”135 Effectively, Citizens United stands for the proposition
that corporations and unions can provide funding for “electioneering communications”; however, that right, as protected by the First Amendment,
does not include a right to remain anonymous. 136 What is particularly telling about the Court’s treatment of disclosure and anonymity in Citizens
United is that the speech at issue was of the most political kind—that which
pertains to voting.137 Yet, the Court did not find that corporations and unions held an anonymity right, which, by implication, suggests no anonymity
right exists.
It should be noted, Justice Thomas, in dissent, did not agree with the
Court’s treatment of the disclosure requirement of the BCRA.138 Justice
Thomas plainly stated, “Congress may not abridge the ‘right to anonymous
speech.’”139 Justice Thomas’s opinion seems to rest on his reading of McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission and the effect of the disclosure requirement, because some donors allegedly “were blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation.”140 Justice Thomas’s understanding that
there exists a right to anonymity caused him to conclude that the Court’s
opinion “will ultimately prove as misguided (and ill fated).”141
Despite Justice Thomas’s interpretation in his impassioned dissent, the
Court did not recognize a right to anonymity in Citizens United. Importantly, the Court did not even begin with an analysis that recognized such a
right.142
134. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (analyzing the issue, the majority, concurrence, and dissent each offered an equally lengthy analysis viewing the disclosure as constitutional, with the exception of Justice Thomas in dissent).
135. Id. at 914. The language the Court used is a reference to the McConnell v. Federal Election Commission case, which was overruled by Citizens United. McConnell v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). Perhaps, there is an argument to be made here that
there cannot be an anonymity right that protects online defamers because it would not prevent them from speaking: they have already spoken. Id.
136. See id. at 914 (the Court all but stated this by suggesting that the free speech
right is only infringed when someone is “prevented” from speaking).
137. If any kind of speech can be called political, it is that which pertains to the process or action of partaking in government: in particular, voting.
138. See id. at 980 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 980 (2010) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 276 (2003)).
140. Id. at 980 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. Ostensibly, if there were an anonymity
right even potentially implicated, the highest court in the land would have discussed it in its
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The Supreme Court gave a more telling analysis to the right of anonymity in a relatively recent anonymity case, Doe v. Reed.143 In Washington
State, a procedure was available for voters to challenge law by referendum.
“Roughly four percent of Washington voters must sign a petition to place
such a referendum on the ballot.”144 Copies of the petitions, including the
names and addresses of those who signed the petition, were available to
private persons upon request.145 The Supreme Court in Reed analyzed the
broad question: “whether disclosure of referendum petitions in general,”
would violate the First Amendment.146 The Court, in no uncertain terms,
held that “disclosure . . . would not violate the First Amendment with respect to referendum petitions in general.”147
Justice Stevens, in concurrence, refuted the position that the First
Amendment contains a right to anonymity: “[O]ur decision in McIntyre
posited no such freewheeling right. The Constitution protects ‘freedom of
speech.’ The right, however, is the right to speak, not the right to speak
without being fined or the right to speak anonymously.”148 Thus, Reed represents a clear example in which the Court was challenged by a group of
plaintiffs asserting a right to anonymity, and the Court expressly held that
there was no such general right to anonymity.149
The Supreme Court’s treatment of a “right to anonymity” is admittedly
unclear.150 Some opinions seem to plainly state a right to anonymity, while
others seem to firmly disclaim that right.151 Similarly, there is great dissonance between the individual Justices’ analyses of the supposed right within
many of the cases.
Although the Supreme Court cannot be said to hold a well-defined position regarding a right to anonymity, it can be said, in so far as there is a
right, it is narrow and applies only to “core political speech.” In part, this
can be demonstrated by the examples the Court returns to time and again as
majority opinion; instead, it was only a single dissenting judge that found it applicable. Id. at
980 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
144. Id. at 2815.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2821.
148. Id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
149. Id. at 2821 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150. There are several cases, none of which explicate any clear rule regarding anonymity. Each case seems narrowly focused within a specific set of facts. See Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811; Watchtower Bible
& Tract Soc’y, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334
(1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
151. See Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; Watchtower, 536
U.S. 150; Buckley, 525 U.S. 182; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; Talley, 362 U.S. 60.
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evidence of the importance of anonymous speech. One example of the
Court’s use of historical reference is found in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, where the court stated:
That tradition is most famously embodied in the Federalist
Papers, authored by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
and John Jay, but signed “Publius.” Publius’ opponents, the
Anti-Federalists, also tended to publish under pseudonyms:
prominent among them were “Cato,” believed to be New
York Governor George Clinton; “Centinel,” probably
Samuel Bryan or his father, Pennsylvania judge and legislator George Bryan; “The Federal Farmer,” who may have
been Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia member of the Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration of Independence; and “Brutus,” who may have been Robert Yates,
a New York Supreme Court justice who walked out on the
Constitutional Convention. A forerunner of all of these
writers was the pre-Revolutionary War English pamphleteer “Junius,” whose true identity remains a mystery.152
The import of the Court’s position is simply that the Federalist Papers are
perhaps the premier example of political speech.153 Thus, the Court, both in
its language and its implied reasoning, suggested that the motivating factor
for protecting an individual’s anonymity is informed by the importance of
the type of the speech. 154
It would be stretching the words of the Supreme Court in its few anonymous speech cases to say it held that a right to anonymity exists; however,
it would be still a greater stretch to announce that such a right exists regardless of the type of speech at issue. If the few anonymous speech cases the
Court has considered can be cited for any general proposition, perhaps it
can be said that anonymity is never a constitutionally protected right unless
political speech is at issue.155

152. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 n.6 (citation omitted).
153. Hamilton expressed in the introduction to the Federalist Papers their significance: “The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing
less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world.” THE
FEDERALIST
NO.
1
(Alexander
Hamilton),
available
at
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_01.html.
154. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343.
155. See Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; Watchtower, 536
U.S. 150; Buckley, 525 U.S. 182; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; Talley, 362 U.S. 60.
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POLITICAL SPEECH

The notion that all speech is not the same is not new to discussions of
defamation. In perhaps the Supreme Court’s best known defamation case,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court set forth a separate
(higher) standard of protection for certain types of defamation, namely
those that concern public officials.156 In Sullivan, the Court held:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
“actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.157
What the Court refers to, as “a privilege for criticism of official conduct,” is
a marked distinction from the clear alternative: treating every defamatory
statement the same.158 The Court quoted the trial court’s characterization of
the defamatory statements at issue, where they were treated as libelous per
se. When a statement is libelous per se, “the law . . . implies legal injury
from the bare fact of publication itself[,] . . . falsity and malice are presumed[,] . . . general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed[, and] . . . punitive damages may be awarded by the jury even
though the amount of actual damages is neither found nor shown.”159
The Sullivan Court moved away from this standard and bolstered the
First Amendment protection of the defendant’s statements. Why? Because
of the nature of the speech: what it was and, more important, what it sought
to accomplish. The Court offers its conception of what the defendant’s
speech did: “It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.”160 The Court, in no uncertain terms, asserted that some kinds of speech (in this case, speech that critiqued a public
figure) are more valuable and thus have a stronger claim to First Amendment protections.161
Thus, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan set forth the critical distinction
between defamatory speech that is directed at a public official and all other
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964).
Id. at 279-80.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 266.
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
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kinds of defamatory speech. The Sullivan Court saw it as an imperative that
politically motivated speech deserve great protection, for it is political
speech that advances society and the union, and it does so in a manner distinct from all other kinds of speech.162
Some states have sought additional protection for politically motivated
speech. Some states, like Illinois and California, have enacted what are referred to as Anti-SLAPP statutes.163 These statutes were passed in response
to what those states’ legislatures saw as an unnecessary increase in litigation to chill political speech.164 Essentially, a person’s actions “in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government are immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government
action, result, or outcome.”165 With this simple legislation, the ability of a
person to “chill” political speech through the filing of a lawsuit is all but
eliminated.166
The Sullivan opinion and Anti-SLAPP statutes are salient because, if
taken with the above interpretation of the Court’s treatment of anonymity,
they support the proposition that political speech is (or at least can be with
state legislation) entitled to significant protection without Section 230 of the

162. Id. at 265. The Supreme Court discussed the importance of speech in Roth v.
United States, quoting:
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The
importance of this consists, besides the advancement of truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them,
whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (quoting 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 108 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., Library of Congress 1904) (1774), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjclink.html.).
163. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2011); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.16 (2012).
164. The Illinois Act states the policy for its enactment:
There has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits termed “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation” in government or “SLAPPs” as they
are popularly called. The threat of SLAPPs significantly chills and diminishes citizen participation in government, voluntary public service,
and the exercise of these important constitutional rights. This abuse of
the judicial process can and has been used as a means of intimidating,
harassing, or punishing citizens and organizations for involving themselves in public affairs.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (2011).
165. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2011).
166. See Sandholm v. Kuecker, 942 N.E.2d 544, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
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CDA. The CDA is merely adding unnecessary burdens by protecting not
only political speech but also speech that is less deserving of protection.167
VI.

THE PROBLEM: RESTATED

If this Comment has established that there is no broad right to anonymity and that a publisher “is not free to publish with impunity everything
and anything it desires to publish,” what does this mean for the use and
effectiveness of the Communications Decency Act?168 Simply stated, as
suggested above, the Communications Decency Act (CDA) is overly broad.
If the legislative intent imbedded in the statute in Part (b) of Section 230 is
the goal that the statute seeks to effectuate, Section 230 is not only satisfying those goals, but it is doing more than that: it is doing too much.
Section 230 sets forth the policy that drives its enactment in Part (b) of
that section:
It is the policy of the United States (1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize
user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for
the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity,
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.169
The laudable goals that Section 230(b) of the CDA purports to attain do not
include protection of a defamer like The Count or the defamer in Zeran.170
In fact, one commentator has noted, the goal of the CDA (as its name suggests) is really about “encourag[ing] interactive computer services to stomp

167. The distinction is between the anonymous speech offered by Zeran’s defamer
and the anonymous speech that gave us the Federalist Papers.
168. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972).
169. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2011).
170. See supra Part II.D.1.
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out smut on the Internet.”171 If this analysis is correct, the assertion that
Section 230 was put in place to permit persons like The Count or Zeran’s
defamer to speak freely with anonymity is facially invalid.172 If the CDA is
about cleaning up the internet, providing broad protections for false and
damaging statements on the internet seems to run counter to that very principle.173
Defamation is a carefully built and studied puzzle, one that the courts
struggle with every day. The complex area of law has developed from
tongue removal (its first penalty) to a vast and increasingly complicated
area of legal practice.174 The CDA constitutes an overtly swift and unduly
broad change to a slowly and cautiously developed area of the common
law.175
VII.

SOME OUTSIDE PERSPECTIVE

While, to a significant degree, a true solution to the shortcomings of
Section 230 of the CDA is beyond the scope of a comment, some account
of possible solutions is necessary.
Much of the debate of Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act centers on the Zeran court’s treatment of distributor liability. Simply
stated, the court in Zeran held that distributors, as a subset of publishers, are
entitled to immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act.176 Essentially, the Zeran court held that regardless of AOL’s
knowledge or wrong, the CDA granted them total immunity, leaving Zeran
without recourse.177 Many commentators see the downfall of Section 230 in

171. Sheridan, supra note 50, at 170.
172. It doesn’t seem too much to assume that false statements poking fun at the Oklahoma City bombings amount to “smut” on most moral scales. See Zeran v. Am. Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
173. Sheridan, supra note 50, at 172.
174. See SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 1:2. Smolla provides an account of the first defamation remedy:
Centuries ago the remedy for defamation was to cut out the offender’s
tongue. This barbaric pre-13th century remedy gave way to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, which treated slander as a spiritual offense, punishing the sin with appropriate penance. The sinner would be
wrapped in a white shroud and required to kneel in public, holding a
lighted candle and acknowledging his false witness before the priest and
parish wardens, begging the pardon of God and the injured party.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
175. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet Service Provider for Internet
or E-mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 5th 169 § 5 (2000).
176. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
177. Id.
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the Zeran court’s interpretation of the CDA, not the CDA itself.178 Particularly, this attack focuses on the total elimination of distributor liability. 179
This criticism essentially relies on the fact that distributors (like publishers)
are as culpable as the speaker and that distributors (like publishers) are the
ones that make the defamatory statement damaging.180 This understanding
of defamation law is the law everywhere, except where the CDA is king:
the internet.
However, the criticism is broader than a grumble with the publisher/distributor distinction; many commentators struggle with finding a rationale for the asymmetry Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
creates between traditional print media and the internet.181 In other words,
under the CDA, there is a unique immunity granted for publishers and distributors in only one of the many media for speech.
At risk of overstating the obvious, note that the CDA grants not a privilege, not a heightened burden of proof, but immunity. If, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., AOL had been a newspaper, Zeran could have sued the
newspaper and his defamer (assuming he could identify him or wanted
to).182 Yet, after the enactment of the CDA and the interpretation of it by the
Zeran court, the internet has its own law of defamation distinct from that
which applies to every other medium for communication.183 As one commentator has noted: “there is every possibility of the common law tort of
178. See Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation
Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 473 (2004);
Sheridan, supra note 50, at 170. This is not to say that the Zeran holding is exclusively criticized, for that would be far from an accurate portrayal of its treatment. It is praised as well as
criticized. See Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online
Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 647
(2000).
179. See Lee, supra note 178, at 473; Sheridan, supra note 50, at 170; Neil Fried,
Dodging the Communications Decency Act when Analyzing Libel Liability of Online Services: Lunney v. Prodigy Treats Service Provider like Common Carrier, 1 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 38 (1999).
180. See SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:78. Smolla states: “on the quaint homespun
logic that ‘[t]alebearers are as bad as talemakers,’ each repetition of a defamatory statement
by a new person constitutes a new publication, rendering the repeater liable for that new
publication.” Id.; see Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
181. See Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional
Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1483 (2006).
182. That Zeran might not have even tried to sue the original perpetrator of all his
problems is not as odd as it first seems. Assuming Zeran does not know the identity of his
defamer or the depth of his pockets, most lawyers may advise their client to pursue only
AOL. See Marc A. Lavaia, Defamation by Proxy: Can the Internet Provide a Shield from
Liability?, ROBINSONBROG.COM, http://www.robinsonbrog.com/CM/Articles/Articles13.html
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
183. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (holding that the plaintiff’s claim failed, arguably
only for the reason that it was internet defamation).
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defamation dying an unnatural death in the near future. The known definitions and concepts in relation to the publisher, qualified privilege, publication, anonymous defamer, slander, or place of defamation have undergone a
tremendous change.”184
Another criticism of the Communications Decency Act addresses not
the CDA itself but a related matter: disclosure standards in John Doe defamation actions. Because internet defamers often post under pseudonyms,
for example “The Count,” the plaintiff may not be able to simply serve their
defamer with a complaint and summons.185 Thus, as discussed above in Part
III,186 the defamed plaintiff may choose to bring a John Doe defamation
action to compel disclosure of the person’s identity.187 While an interactive
computer service such as AOL (to use the language of the CDA) may offer
the identity without hesitation, this is not the only possible reaction. As was
seen in the Dendrite case, the interactive computer service (ICS), or the
anonymous defamer, may try to challenge the subpoena.188
To simplify this complex area of the law, there are three likely results
stemming from the issuance of a subpoena to disclose the identity of a John
Doe defamer: (1) the ICS will comply and give up the identity of the alleged defamer;189 (2) the ICS will give notice to the anonymous defamer in
order to provide them an opportunity to quash the subpoena;190 or (3) the
ICS will flatly refuse, leaving the court to weigh the competing interests of
the alleged defamer and the allegedly defamed.191 It is this third scenario

184. See Mohd Altaf Hussein Ahangar, Mohd Altaf Hussain Ahangar on Defamation
in the Cyber Age: The Emerging Trends, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5375 (2010).
185. Professor Smolla refers to the use of pseudonyms as communication “conducted
behind the facade of screen-names.” SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:86:50.
186. See supra part III.A and note 50.
187. See SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:86:50.
188. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
189. See SMOLLA, supra note 15, § 4:86:50. This is the opposite of the Zeran case.
For if AOL had simply disclosed the identity of the defamer, the plaintiff would have had at
least one meaningful opportunity to seek a remedy. However, in Zeran’s case, even AOL’s
willingness to disclose would have been fruitless because, as the court noted, “Zeran maintains that AOL made it impossible to identify the original party by failing to maintain adequate records of its users.” Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997).
190. This scenario, while possible, is made less likely by the lack of an incentive on
the part of the ICS. Because Section 230 provides blanket immunity for someone like AOL,
the ICS (AOL) has no interest in helping the plaintiff find a defendant. If the ICS chooses to
do nothing, there is no legal consequence to them. In fact, the limited interest an ICS has is
arguably limited to its consumer/client, furthering the argument that the ICS is unlikely to
give up the name of the anonymous defamer. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (West 2011).
191. This is the scenario that Zeran was left in, the scenario that led to Dendrite
International, Inc. v. Doe, and the leading disclosure standard. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329;
Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d 756.
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that has prompted considerable scholarly commentary.192 The discussion
centers on the disclosure standards, as set forth above in Part III, where the
Dendrite/Cahill test was considered.193 Some courts rely on the higher
Dendrite summary judgment standard, whereas Illinois, under its Rule 224,
applies a considerably lower motion to dismiss standard.194 For those who
have critiqued the Dendrite disclosure standard, or other standards, much of
the criticism rests on the inconsistency and confusion among the multiple
standards and jurisdictions.195 Because there is such great divide in the interpretation of the disclosure standard to be used, there is an added confusion and uncertainty for litigants who may therefore be hesitant to pursue a
John Doe defamation action in the first place.196
VIII.

THE SOLUTIONS

Although every hypothesized solution to the problems caused by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act holds merit, the following
two solutions best comport with the common law of defamation. This
Comment attempts to show that the new and ever-growing medium of the
internet is not deserving of, nor does it require, a new body of defamation
law. Constitutional interpretation of anonymity rights and a relaxed disclosure standard (like Illinois’s Rule 224) can serve to fairly balance the right
of free speech and the right of a defamed plaintiff to be made whole.
The motion to dismiss standard, as exemplified by Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 224, is the disclosure standard that best effectuates a balance
between the rights of the alleged defamer and the allegedly defamed.197 As
192. See Jennifer O’Brien, Putting a Face to a Name: The First Amendment Implications of Compelling ISPs to Reveal the Identities of Anonymous Internet Speakers in Online
Defamation Cases, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745 (2002); Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing
Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C.
L. REV. 833 (2010).
193. See supra Part III.A.
194. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d 756; Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del.
2005); Maxon v. Ottawa Publ’g Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 673 (3d Cir. 2010).
195. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn
from John Doe? 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373 (2009); Courtney T. Shilling, Unmasking Online
Assailants: When Should an Anonymous Online Poster Be Exposed for Defamatory Content? (April 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Chicago-Kent College of Law),
available at http://works.bepress.com/courtney_shillington/1/ (last visited Feb 12, 2012).
The confusion and complexity amongst the many standards is great. For example, Shilling
contends that there is a greater distinction between the Dendrite and Cahill tests than was
suggested here, ultimately suggesting that there are four not three disclosure standards. Id.
However, one thing remains constant: critics agree that uniformity is desirable. Id.
196. See Lavaia, supra note 182.
197. It should be noted that Illinois, with Supreme Court Rule 224, is not the only
jurisdiction to apply such a standard. See Shilling, supra note 195.
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discussed above and as the Maxon court stated, trial courts have mechanisms in place that are more than sufficient to ensure that frivolous unmasking requests do not succeed—namely, the motion to dismiss.198 To require,
as the Dendrite199 and Cahill200 courts did, that a plaintiff be able to show
facts and evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment is an exceedingly high burden.201 At such an early stage in the litigation, where the plaintiff
does not even know the identity of their defamer, it is unlikely, perhaps
impossible, for a plaintiff to have the necessary facts and evidence to survive summary judgment.202 The Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224, or motion
to dismiss standard, is the best of those adopted by the courts because it
provides plaintiffs with a meaningful opportunity to litigate their claims.203
To succeed in a defamation action is difficult, to say the least. Raising the
discovery barriers even higher, under a test like the Dendrite test, merely
because the speech was made on the internet is simply unnecessary.204
Additionally, the notion that there is a balance to be struck between a
speaker’s anonymity right and the right of plaintiffs to litigate their claims
is unsupported.205 This Comment has attempted to establish that there is no
broad right to anonymity.206 While the Supreme Court has recognized some
narrow anonymity rights, they apply only in the context of political
speech.207 Additionally, the narrow scope of the anonymity right should be
considered together with the Maxon court’s repeated reminder “that there is
no constitutional right to defame.”208
So, what does this mean for the CDA? Simply stated, Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act is not the most effective way to achieve
the goals of Congress. The speech that is in greatest need of protection—

198. See Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 673.
199. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 759.
200. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (2005).
201. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 772; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 468 (holdings by
both courts found the plaintiff’s claims insufficient to meet the high unmasking burden).
202. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc., 775 A.2d at 772. Dendrite should be distinguished from
a lower standard, like that in Maxon, where the chances of success for a plaintiff are significantly higher. See Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 716.
203. See Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 716.
204. See Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 2.
205. See supra Part IV and note 103.
206. See supra Part IV and note 118.
207. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Doe v.
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc. v. Village of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150 (2002); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960).
208. Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 675.
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political speech—is already protected.209 First Amendment case law like
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan210 and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission211 together with state protections, like Anti-SLAPP statutes, have provided broad and powerful protections for political speech. Section 230 of
the CDA is not doing much to protect an already heavily protected class of
speech. However, Section 230 of the CDA does have a great impact. What
the CDA does is two-fold: it treats internet publishers differently than print
publishers merely because they are on the internet, and it protects and immunizes a less deserving kind of speech. Speech that targets private persons
becomes protected—speech like that directed at Zeran or Oliver (our fictional donut shop owner). Because “political” speech is already significantly protected, the protections offered by the CDA offer the most significant
change to “private defamation” (defamation which targets private persons
and small businesses). Those private persons who have been defamed on
the internet are less likely to succeed in a legitimate defamation action,
simply because the statements were made online—this is Section 230’s
downfall.212
Because it protects private defamation, or non-political defamatory
speech, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act should be repealed. It has little effect beyond creating an undue asymmetry between
internet and all other kinds of defamation and burdening legitimate defamation claims. Section 230 of the CDA should be repealed to allow victims of
defamation to pursue, as defendants, the publishers, distributors, and
republishers of defamatory content in the same way a person defamed
through any other medium can. Although there may be some fears of a
chilling effect on speech, political speech is in no great danger. Congress,
the Supreme Court, and the states have spent considerable effort ensuring
the freedom to speak politically will not be abridged.213
IX.

CONCLUSION

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is a congressional
overstep. Section 230’s goals are laudable, but its language, application,
and interpretation are overly broad. In attempt to “clean up the internet” and
bolster what are already significant protections, it has failed. Section 230
completely ignores a complex common law history and subsequently un209. This is not to say that “political” speech is absolutely protected, but that it is
entitled to far greater protections than other kinds of speech. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964).
210. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
211. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
212. See Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 2.
213. See supra Part V.
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ravels the careful balancing act that is defamation law. The First Amendment may well be the most important of our freedoms and the one that
needs most vigorous protection. However, the First Amendment has been
carefully balanced alongside plaintiffs’ interests in the careful construction
of the law of defamation. The complex and functioning system of defamation law should not be rewritten every time a new forum for speech is
born.214
BRYANT STORM*

214. If it is the case that the right of a person to seek compensation for injury to
reputation is no longer valued by our society, a new consideration arises. If free speech is
more valuable than a right to cure injury to one’s reputation, perhaps the CDA can be considered a step in the right direction, one that should apply to not just the internet. Perhaps the
CDA is not a step away from traditional defamation law but a step towards no defamation
law. Perhaps, in the words of Justice Powell in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., we should protect communications with a “total sacrifice” of the competing value of defamation. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). Whether such a step is a wise one is certainly
beyond the scope of this Comment, and likely beyond the scope of Congress’s intent in
passing Section 230. Yet, that is perhaps where the argument should next turn.
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